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THE ANOMALY OF THE CIVIL AERO.
NAUTICS BOARD IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT
By HAROLD A. JONES
United States Representative to the Council of ICAO. Formerly,
Member, Civil Aeronautics Board; Yale University, B.A., 1920;
Ohio State University, LL.B., 1923; Member Ohio and California
Bars. Also, formerly, Special Assistant to the Attorney General,
Department of Justice; Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles; and
member of a number of State and Federal committees studying
problems of Government.
T HE Civil Aeronautics Board is a recently created anomaly in our
American social and political system. Our whole American
social and political philosophy, and our social and political institutions,
have been posited largely on the fear of a too strong state, and a belief in
a maximum of personal freedom for the individual American. The
requisite for this maximum personal freedom, as Robin Williams1
points out, is a political structure based on: (1) The dispersion (sep-
aration) of the power of Government; and (2) The limitation of both
public and private power.
The purpose of this article is to present this problem, to propose an
approach to its solution, and to ask a few questions. No attempt is
made to offer a solution.
The anomaly is that, pressed by the expediency of wartime, depres-
sion emergencies, and the almost unbelievable expansion of Govern-
ment, we have, during the past 30 years, created so-called independent
Government commissions which unite in one Government agency the
three powers of government - legislative, executive and judicial, with
little limitation of public power, but almost complete limitation of
private power within the scope of the particular commissions' activities
and contrary to our long established basic political and institutional
philosophy and practice. This is the nub of the problem. It is not a
problem of the reorganization of the executive, or any other Govern-
mental department. It is a problem particularly within the realm of
social science and the more narrow field of political science. It is a bed-
rock problem.
THERE Is SOMETHING WRONG WITH THE
INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSION
It must be granted that the independent regulatory commission
has become an important part of the machinery of government. As
Justice Jackson said, in his opinion in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath:2
1 American Society, Robin M. Williams, Jr. (Knopf, 1951).
2 Wong. Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33; 70 S. Ct. 445; 94 L. Ed. 616
(1950).
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. "Multiplication of Federal Administrative Agencies, and expan-
sion of their functions to include adjudications which have serious
impact upon private rights has been one of the dramatic develop-
ments of the past half century."
Admittedly, also, there is something wrong with the independent
regulatory commissions. 3 In the past ten years more than a dozen com-
mittees or boards, appointed either by Congress or by the Executive,
have turned critical eyes upon the performances of these commissions,
and have found that none of them were functioning in the manner
wholly expected or intended.4 Some thirty bills were introduced in
Congress between 1933 and 1946 intended to reform Administrative
Procedure and Practice alone.5
Government reorganization plans, principally relating to the 100
major Federal agencies exercising delegated powers, but including the
independent regulatory commissions, have been presented by each
Administration for the past 25 years, culminating in the "Hoover Re-
port" of 1949. 6
The very volume of these studies, reports, and the proposed legisla-
tion resulting from them, indicates the pressing importance of the prdb-
lem and that something must be done about it.
THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD
-A GUINEA PIG
Obviously, the nine listed independent regulatory commissions can-
not be examined in one short article. The Civil Aeronautics Board is
chosen because: (a) It is the youngest of the commissions; (b) The Act
creating 11 was supposed to be the ultimate in such legislation, giving
greatly more power and wider discretion than ever before given to a
regulatory agency; and great expectations were held for this "new
deal" in regulatory commissions.8
3 The nine Commissions are: Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal
Power Commission, Federal Trade Commission, U. S. Maritime Commission
(Transferred to Department of Commerce, 1950), Securities & Exchange Com-
mission, Federal Communications Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal
Reserve Board, National Labor Relations Board.
4 A few of the reports by these "Investigating bodies" were: 1941 Report of
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure; Hatch Commit-
tee, 79 Cong. 1 Sess.; Investigation of Executive Agencies of the Government,
S. Rept. 1275, 75 Cong. 1 Sess. (1937); Report of Committee of Three under
Transportation Act of 1940 "Practices & Procedures of Govt. Control." H. Doc.
678, 78 Cong. 2 Sess (1944) ; "Survival in the Air Age," Report by the President's
Air Policy Commission, Jan. 1, 1948; A Report to Congress-The Commission on
Organization of the Executive Branch of the Govt. (Hoover Report), 1949.
5 For excellent chronological chart, see Federal Administrative Law, Laverty
(West Publishing Co.-1952), page 4.
6 See note 4, supra; see also Federal Administrative Law, Laverty (West
Publishing Co.), pp. 373-382.
7 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 49 U.S.C. §402; 52 Stat. 977.
8 "Patterned in some respects as to Administrative setup on the provisions
of the ill-fated (Brownlow) Reorganization Plan, drafted by the draftsman of
the Brownlow Committee which formulated that Plan, the Act is expected to be
the 'guinea pig' in an effort to work out a scheme whereby the President, in spite
of the Humphrey's decision, can exercise control over executive functions of
Administrative Agencies exercising quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions.
"We thus have a 'New Deal' in Administrative Agencies . . . Just how well
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This new "model" agency was supposed to comply with (or perhaps
circumvent) the Supreme Court decision in the Morgan cases9 and the
Humphrey's case. 10 What is wrong with it (if there is anything wrong)
should be easy to discover, since there has been little patchwork done on
it in the 14 years of its existence and its record of experience is long
enough to show up weaknesses. Also, it has been subjected to more
investigations in the last 6 years than any other commission.
Above all, the social and political atmosphere existing at the time
of the enactment of this particular Act is very important and must
always be kept in mind.
Prior to the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act and the later
"new deal" regulatory legislation, regulatory commissions were not
paternalistic. They were not regarded as planning adjuncts to the State,
nor as agencies formed for the purpose of operating State controlled
activities. The Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Power
Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission were essentially "thou
shall not" commissions. Congress created them to correct very real and
existing abuses and to prevent the future happening of similar abuses
harmful to the public welfare. Their duties were pretty well defined
and limited by the abuses they were expected to correct. However, the
later "new deal" commissions, such as the Federal Communications
Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board, were paternalistic in
concept. They were supposed to operate, promote, aid, reward, and
control, as well as to punish and prevent abuses - all in the name of the
public welfare.
The 3 years of hearings on the Civil Aeronautics Act (1935 - 1938)
was a period of political and social State planning. State enterprise
plans took precedent over private rights and private enterprise. Indus-
try was suspect. It should be recalled that the battle cry of the "new
deal" administration in the 1938 elections was - "we planned it that
way!"
CERTAIN PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
No extended examination of our American society, its political
institutions and Government, shall be attempted here. For a common
understanding of the discussion to come, however, it will be necessary
to set forth certain principles which have been established for a long
time and accepted by the American people.
Government, like everything else in life, is an evolutionary process.
Principles of government are evolved by trial and error. Hundreds of
this new Administrative plan will work remains to be seen from experience, as
no plan like it had been put into operation by the Federal Government before the
Authority began to function." Federal Aeronautics Act Annotated. Pyne, pp. 83-
84. (The author was emphasizing the role of administration By Executive Order
part of the executive functions were transferred to the Commerce Department
in 1940.)
9 Morgan vs. U.S. 298, U.S. 468 (1936); 304 U.S. 1 (1937); U.S. vs. Morgan,
307 U.S. 183 (1938); 313 U.S. 409 (1940).
10 Humphrey's Exec. vs. U.S. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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principles, devices, and institutions are tried out by a society over a
period of, say, fifty, one hundred, two hundred, or a thousand years.
Those that really work out over a long period of time survive and are
accepted as basic principles - until something else comes along which
works better. No society or nation is going to voluntarily abandon a
working principle for some untried theory. Certainly, the new theory,
in times of economic stress, war emergency, or other human crisis, will
be given a try; but if it doesn't work a lot better, it will be discarded
when the crisis is over.
The tried principle and untried variation go along side by side
until one or the other proves to be the fitter by popular conviction."
The principles of American Government hereinafter set forth have
survived and worked very well during our brief national life. They
may not be perfect, but until some other principle or. device comes
along which works better over a sufficient period of time, I believe
we will hold on to them.
Separation of Powers
The dispersal and separation of the power of government into three
branches - the legislative, executive and judicial, is not a new device.
It is as old as society itself, but probably more emphasis has been placed
on this principle (or device) by our American society than by any other
modern society. This is probably due to the fact that we Americans
have had greater fear of a powerful central government and greater
appreciation of individual freedom - and the corollary, i.e., the least
dependency on a powerful state, and the greater opportunity to achieve
individual freedom.
There is no such thing as an absolute principle of society or of gov-
ernment. Not even the "right to life." A drafted man in Korea has no
right to life. The principle of the separation of powers is no exception.
The Constitution made no attempt to establish a complete separation
of powers. In fact it set up a system of checks and balances contradict-
ing the absolute right of either of the three departments to solely and
exclusively exercise the powers allocated to it.
Examples are the Chief Executive's veto power; his power to intro-
duce legislation and to hand out patronage, etc.
The legislative branch checks the executive powers of the President
by its appropriation power, approval of Presidential appointments and
treaties, etc. The judiciary check both other branches. It may withhold
approval of legislation departing from the Constitution or traditional
principles, or the acts of a President (such as the recent steel plant
seizure order) which are capricious and arbitrary.
However, this system of checks and balances does not change the
fact that, until very recently, the legislative, executive, and judicial
11 The Forgotten Man and Other Essays, William G. Sumner; Brass Tacks,
A. C. Keller (Knopf), 1938; Science of Society, William G. Sumner and. A. C.
Keller, New Haven, 1927.
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powers were separate, and performed separately -except within well
defined limits. The principle has had the strong backing of public con-
viction. I believe it still has wholehearted popular support. Witness,
for example, the Steel Plant Seizure order, and likewise the attempt to
pack the Supreme Court by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in order
to carry out certain "new deal" planned programs.
This is a good place to bring out the effect of wars and internal
economic crises on the evolutionary process. The basic motives which
compel men to form a society in the first place are to keep alive, to
propagate, and to better life conditions. Spencer called these basic
motives the permanancies of any society. Take away any one and there
is no society. But the individual members of society are willing to
modify for the time being their most cherished beliefs under certain
conditions. Patrick Henry's cry of "Give me liberty or give me death"
is good oratory; but, faced with the choice, an overwhelming majority
of Americans are willing to give up temporarily a pretty large part of
their cherished liberty.
The thing to which they surrender some part of their liberty, or
freedom, is the State or Central Government -the thing American
society has most feared. However, when a Hitler threatens, or economic
disaster seems to threaten, the public reluctantly submits to plans which
take powers away from the legislative branch and the judicial branch,
and lodge them with the executive branch. During these periods we
have war powers and emergency powers. "War Production Boards,"
and "Blue Eagles," new deals, and fair deals.
When the crisis is over the American people revalue these emer-
gency programs against the background of their fundamental philos-
ophy- the fear of statism, and their belief in the maximal freedom
of the individual. And it is this process which is going on now. And
it is against this background that we are examining the powers and
functions granted to the Civil Aeronautics Board and other so-called
independent regulatory commissions, because most of them came into
being during these past twenty years marked by economic crisis, World
War, and the unprecedented growth of a central government to cope
with the situation.
This growth of the central Government, and the concomitant mush-
rooming of administrative agencies within the departments of the
executive branch and the creation of so-called independent commissions
exercising executive, legislative, and judicial powers, does not mean
that American society has abandoned its fear of big government or its
belief in the separation of powers. It merely signifies that the evolu-
tionary process has not caught up with the crisis born expansion of
the executive branch of Government. The American people still fear
a too powerful state, and still believe in a maximal freedom for the
individual. They still hold that: (1) The division, separation, and dis-
persal of power between the Executive, Congress, and the Judiciary;
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and (2) The limitation of both public and private power, it requisite
to an American system of government.12
Limited Power of Congress to Delegate
Legislative Authority
The power of Congress to delegate legislative authority to inde-
pendent commissions or the executive branch of the Government is
limited. The limit, I think, was well stated by Chief justice Marshall
long ago. "A general provision may be made," said Marshall, referring
to legislation enacted by Congress, "and power given to those who are
to act under such general provisions to fill up the details."'13 (Emphasis
added.
Congress may not, in other words, avoid or shirk its duty and re-
sponsibility to decide what is in the public interest by delegating that
power to the executive branch or an independent commission.
This principle of American Government is, of course, closely akin,
or part of, the principle of the separation of powers. It grows out of the
same fears and hopes. It is found in the belief of the people that Con-
gress is more of the people, closer to the people, and better fitted to
decide what is in the public interest than the Executive, or a commis-
sion appointed by the Executive.
The difficulty arises, of course, when these questions are asked:
What is a "general provision" of legislation? What is a legislative de-
tail?
At one end of the scale there is a broad zone which clearly is not
a "detail" zone. On the other end of the scale is another zone which
clearly is a "detail" zone. In between there is a rather narrow, hazy,
overlapping zone where these questions may arise.
Reasonable Predictability of Commissions Actions
A third working principle of American Government is that the law
delegating powers to a department of Government or commission
should be of such nature that those who are to act under it may, or
must, apply known principles and reasoning so that there will be rea-
sonable predictability as to the outcome.
The background of this principle is the Common Law, and the rule
of stare decisis.
"I cannot believe that any person who at all values the judicial
process or distinguishes its method and philosophy from those of
the political and legislative process would abhndon or substan-
tially impair the rule of stare decisis. Unless the assumption is
substantially true that cases will be disposed of by application of
known principles and previously disclosed courses of reasoning,
our common-law process would become the most intolerable kind of
ex post facto judicial law making. Moderation in change is all that
12 American Society, supra, pp. 262-264.
13 Wayman vs. Southead (1825) 10 Wheat. 1; 6 L. Ed. 253.
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makes judicial participation in the evolution of the law tolerable.
Either judges must be fettered to mere application of a legislative
code with a minimum of discretion, as in continental systems, or
they must formulate and adhere to some voluntary principles that
will impart stability and predictability to judicial discretion.
"The first essential of a lasting precedent is that the court or
the majority that promulgates it be fully committed to its principle.
That means such individual study of its background and anteced-
ents, its draftsmanship and effects that at least when it is an-
nounced it represents not a mere acquiescence but a conviction of
those who support it. When that thoroughness and conviction are
lacking, a new case, presenting a different aspect or throwing a
new light, results in overruling or in some other escape from it, that
is equally unsettling to the law."'14
It cannot be argued that the rule of stare decisis be absolute. In fact
in administrative law it must be reasonably adaptable or the rule will
defeat the purpose. But a provision in an Act which a quasi-judicial
board or quasi-legislative board is called upon to interpret must be
subject to disposal by the application of some known principles and
previously disclosed courses of reasoning, or we sacrifice to administra-
tive expedience our judicial or legislative process and submit to "the
most intolerable kind of ex post facto judicial law making."
The doctrine of stare decisis and predictability is not confined to
the judicial process. The members of the American society also expect
the legislative branch and the executive branch to do justice, and to
follow known principles. The methods and philosophy may differ, but
unless these principles are followed by Congress, or by the Executive,
the electorate will see that a new set of Congressmen or a new Presi-
dent will be elected to carry out the principles established by public
conviction.
The above applies equally, to an independent regulatory commis-
sion, especially one dealing with private rights. If by trial and error over
a period of time it appears that an agency is incapable of the applica-
tion of known principles backed by public conviction in the disposal
of a matter before it - either judicial, legislative, or executive, then
the public will either abolish the agency or see that Congress enacts
a law correcting the situation. The members of American society must
have reasonable predictability from its Government. It will not long
stand for ex post facto law making by an agency of Government, be it
a department or a commission.
Independent Commissions Must Be Free From Pressures
A fourth principle is that in order to function properly an inde-
pendent commission must not be subjected to pressures by any of the
three branches of Government or by any private persons or group.
14 The. Hon. Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the
United States-article in American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 20, June, 1944.
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THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE
BOARD RUN CONTRARY TO THE FOUR DESCRIBED
PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT
The Civil Aeronautics Board (and the Civil Aeronautics Act) must
be tested for fitness against the background of the four guiding prin-
ciples before set forth. It may be that the complexity of modern Amer-
ican society and its Government, have made some, or all, of these
principles obsolete. Perhaps some, or all, need modification. But until
this is proven by actual experience, we would be foolish to abandon
them.
The questions to be asked, therefore, would seem to be: (1) Does
the Civil Aeronautics Act, and the functions of the Board under it,
run contrary to any or all of these principles? and (2) If so, how has
the experiment worked out? 5
Separation of Powers
The Civil Aeronautics Act purposely scrambled or combined broad
executive, legislative, and judicial powers in an Act to be exercised
by one "authority."
Applying the test: How has this experiment worked out, I find that
it has not worked out very well. In every route case the Board wears
three hats - the promoter (representing the executive branch of the
Government), the regulatory (representing the legislative branch) , and
the judge of a controversy often involving important property rights
and private interest (representing the judiciary).
It is improbable that two of these functions could be combined in
one proceeding and substantial justice be done. It is well nigh impos-
sible that all three can be successfully combined in the same proceeding
and substantial justice be done to all parties concerned.
We also have (since part of the promotional powers were taken
away from the Board and given to the Department of Commerce in
1940) the exceedingly contradictory and anomalous situation of the
Department of Commerce developing a route pattern through its
power to finance and lay out airways, airports, and facilities, and to
furnish them free of user charges; and a so-called independent regula-
tory commission also planning an air route system and an air transport
system and bringing such plans into being by the devices of certificates
of public convenience and necessity and subsidy in the form of air
mail pay.16
15 The Civil Aeronautics Act and the Board were a "New Deal" experiment-
a guinea pig. See note 8, supra. See also "The Effect of Political Interest
Groups on C.A.B. Policies" by Basil J. F. Mott, Jr., 19 J. Air L. 379.16 "In addition to the failure to relate the various promotional activities
of the federal transportation agencies, there are other defects which stand in the
way of a rational program of transport development. Among these is the fact
that many highly important administrative and planning functions which prop-
erly belong in the executive branch of the government have come to be confused
with regulatory functions and included among the responsibilities of the inde-
pendent commissions. . . .To illustrate, the Civil Aeronautics Administration
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The Hoover Commission had something to say on this scrambling
of the three major powers of Government. "Purely executive duties,"
the report stated (Book 2, p. 7), "have been imposed on the commis-
sions with the result that these duties have sometimes been performed
badly. The necessity for performing them has interferred with the per-
formance of the strictly regulatory functions of the commission."
Promotional functions, the Hoover Commission held, being execu-
tive functions, should be the responsibility of the executive branch,
saying (separate pamphlet - Department of Commerce, pp. 23-24)
"Hitherto, route patterns have been determined haphazardly upon a
case-by-case basis by regulatory commissions. Routes should be planned
with careful consideration for the total transportation needs of the
country and the areas to be served, and for the services already avail-
able by all means of transportation. Aviation route planning particu-
larly is a highly important promotional tool. Air route planning should
be coordinated with airway and airport development programs.
"A regulatory body which operates on a case-by-case basis is inher-
ently unable to engage in the long-range research and planning which
air-route planning requires."
It would seem that the old and tried principle of the separation of
powers is sound on a pragmatic basis as well as a basic principle of
American Governmental philosophy.
Limited Power of Congress to Delegate
Legislative Authority
Section II of the Civil Aeronautics Act has been interpreted by the
Board and the courts to be a delegation of power to carry out the broad
objectives there stated.' 7
I do not believe Congress may state a broad national policy found
by it to be in the national interest, and then delegate to a Presidentially
appointed five man commission the duty and responsibility of enacting
legislation (in the form of regulations, grants of subsidy, or certificates
of public convenience and necessity) to carry out such a policy. I con-
attempts in its airway and airport programs to plan an air transportation sys-
tem which will meet the objectives laid down by Congress. But obviously a
system of air transportation does not consist merely of the basic physical plant;
it includes in addition the services provided by equipment operating over these
facilities. Determination of the routes over which public carriers shall operate,
and the nature of these operations, however, is under jurisdiction of the Civil
Aeronautics Board. We thus have the anomalous situation of one federal agency
determining the route pattern for air carriers and another planning the federal
program to bring the routes into being."
"Confusion of the proper functions of the executive branch of the govern-
ment and the proper role of the independent commissions has likewise been seen
in the untenable division of authority for aviation safety, and in the promotional
objectives of air mail payments which are entrusted to the C.A.B. This confusion
between planning, promotion and administrative responsibilities on the one hand,
and the regulatory activities of the independent commission on the other, not
only deprives the executive departments of effectively exercising their responsi-
bilities, but imposes burdens and distractions which interfere with the effective
conduct of the regulatory function.'--National Transportation Policy-Brook-
ings Institution (1949), pp. 134-136.
17 See American Airlines, Inc. vs. C.A.B., 192 F 2nd 417 (1951).
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sider such a case to be clearly an abrogation of duty and responsibility
and not a Constitutional delegation of power.
I do not believe Congress may state to a commission: "It is in the
national interest and public welfare to promote an air transportation
system adequate to the needs of commerce, the Postal Service, and the
national defense - you go ahead and fill in the details."
The Civil Aeronautics Board, under the Act as interpreted by the
courts, now has the power to virtually nationalize the air transport
system. If Congress intended this result, certainly the American public
did not.
For example, in the Air Freight Case'8 the Board in effect held that
the Civil Aeronautics Act delegated to it the duty and responsibility
of "promoting" an air transport system adequate to meet the present
and future needs of the commerce of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense (all national interest objectives) ;
that granting certificates of public convenience and necessity was an act
of promotion; and that the decision could be predicated, in part at
least, upon its "vision of the shape of things to come" - all in the public
interest.
This decision was not the "filling up the details" under a general
provision of law. It was legislation de novo under a declared objective
of national policy - a duty and responsibility which I do not believe
Congress can escape or delegate, and certainly not one which a five
man board, appointed by the President for six years terms, and not
experienced in legislation, can properly perform. It may be that Gov-
ernment and industry have grown so complex that our fundamental
principles must be disregarded, and it has become necessary for Con-
gress to turn over to some agency appointed by the President a broad
national objective and say, in effect: "Promote for the Nation an ade-
quate communication system - you make the laws." Even so, I do not
believe a five man, President appointed, commission is the proper
agency.
Aside from the legal point, we must still ask the questions: Does
such a delegation, which is contrary to our second principle of good
government, work? Has the Board been able to "fill up the details?"
The answers are quite generally, no.
Two or three examples should demonstrate this point. The Board
was given the broad duty of planning and promoting an air transporta-
tion system sufficient for the needs (present and future) of commerce,
the Postal Service, and the national defense. It has not done so to any-
one's satisfaction. 9
It has been unable to determine criteria which will enable it to
"fill in" what charges to the public (rates) or need mail pay to the air
18Air Freight Case, 10 C.A.B. 572, 646 (1949).
19 "Too engrossed in case-by-case activities and thus fails to plan its role and
to promote the enterprise entrusted to its case." Report of Hoover Commission;
see, also, Report of President's Air Policy Commission, 1948; National Trans-
portation Policy, supra, p. 134.
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lines (subsidy) shall be paid to promote such a system and to provide
these services at reasonable cost.
20
But the most striking example of its inability to "fill in" details
appears in its duty to provide competition to the extent necessary. Over
the fourteen years of the Act's life, successive Boards (for the member-
ship turnover has been such that there have been several Boards, in
fact) and the members have reacted like the "blind men and the Ele-
phant" in the old verse. 21 The phrase is so broad in the context of the
Act that it has meant all things to all members, and no majority could
agree from route case to route case, just what application it should
have.
Consequently, the Board (or various combinations of members)
have boxed the compass a dozen times on the point - from "competi-
tion for competition sake" to competition only when substantial evi-
dence proves that the carrier or carriers serving a route are not pro-
viding service adequate to the economics of the case. 22
The failure of Congress to limit its delegation of powers under the
Act to legal, reasonable, and workable limits seems to be indicated by
past experience.
Reasonable Predictability of Commission's Actions
Repetitious as it may be, I must again state that the structure of
American society pretty much rests on a fear of a too strong central
Government, and a belief in the maximum of freedom for the indi-
vidual.
"Requisites for maximal freedom are: (1) Dispersion of power;
and (2) Limitation of both public and private power by rules that take
their departure from a high evaluation of individual personality and
consent."
23
The consent of the people to the lodgment of power in any branch,
department, or commission is subject to various limitations. One of the
chief ones (which is the foundation of our common law) is that such
agencies of Government must exercise their powers with a, reasonable
degree of predictability. Those who are to act under powers entrusted
to them by consent must apply known and accepted principles and rea-
soning to matters submitted to them for disposal.
If a contract be broken there are certain known principles and rea-
soning which the courts will apply. Private enterprise and private
20 For an excellent comment on this. point, see National Transportation
Policy, supra, at pp. 215, 217.
21 "It was six men of Indostan
To learning much inclined
Who went to see the elephant
(Though all of them were blind)
That each from observation
Might satisfy his mind." Stanza I.
22 For an excellent review of the cases down to 1948, see Westwood, Choice
of the Air Carriers for New Air Transport Routes, 16 Geo. Washington Law
Review 1 (1947); see, also, Air Transportation, Nicholson, pp. 432, 433. See
"Administrative Curtailment of Airline Operation" 20 J. Air L. 108.
23 American Society, Robins, pp. 263, 264.
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property rights cannot exist otherwise. Known principles and reason-
ing must be applied in cases of theft, fraud, or unlawful seizure of
property. The situation would be intolerable if this were not the case.
The acts of the Civil Aeronautics Board are no exception. Matters
are submitted to it for decision which involve very important private
rights, including valuable property rights. In submitting these matters,
individual Americans (persons or corporations) are entitled to demand
that known principles or standards and previously disclosed courses
of reasoning will be applied by the Board in making its decision.
We now come to the question: Has the Civil Aeronautics Board
developed known principles or standards? Has its applied courses of
reasoning with any degree of consistency?
The answers to both questions seem to be negative. And this failure
to develop standards, principles, and courses of reasoning is apparent
in its decisions.
The examples given in the previous subsections are applicable
here: (1) The case-by-case approach in route cases marked by incon-
sistence in approach and inconsistence in the application of standards;
(2) The inability to adopt principles or standards relative to such
matters as "necessary competition"; (3) The inability to determine
criteria for determining rates and subsidy.
The objective of a sound, stable air transportation system cannot be
attained unless the commission entrusted with its regulation and de-
velopment is itself sound and stable. Unless private enterprise entrusted
with organizing, financing, managing, and operating the system can
predict with a reasonable degree of certainty what the commission will
do with regard to private enterprise and property interests under given
conditions,24 it cannot organize, finance, or operate properly.
Independent Commissions Must Be Free
From Pressures
The principle hardly needs stating as applied to the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. It has been entrusted with matters of vast importance
to the commerce, Postal Service, and national defense. It has also been
entrusted with matters of vast importance to private enterprise and
private rights.
Balancing national interest and the private rights of individuals is
difficult at the best. For example, the Board is presented with this prob-
24 "It still appears that many of the Commissions have not gone as far as
is feasible or desirable in laying down standards or in adhering to their an-
nounced standards. In granting new route cases, for instance, the Civil Aero-
nautics Board provides very little help in understanding its governing principles;
its opinions suggest that the Board has failed to face squarely the need for an
underlying program." (emphasis added) Hoover Commission Task Force Report
(separate pamphlet) on Regulatory Commissions, p. 5.
"The investigative staff was advised by one carrier that it had been ad-
monished by the Accounting and Rates Division for over-scheduling on one seg-
ment of its route-and yet had been ordered, by another Bureau of the Board,
to show cause why a competing carrier should not be certificated to service the
same segment because existing service was inadequate." Hearings before Sub-
committee of Committee on Appropriations, 81st Congress, Second Sess., p. 1835.
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lem: Carriers A, B, and C have been certificated to operate a route
between East Coast City and West Coast City. They have spent millions
of dollars to organize, finance, and operate their respective business on
this route. They are providing adequate, excellent service on the route
and are doing a profitable business without Government assistance.
The claim is made that other carriers should be permitted to operate
the same route in order to build up a larger reservoir of planes and
men in the interest of possible future use in the national defense; that
these additional carriers would "promote" the kind of system envisaged
by the Act; and that competition is needed. These additional carriers
would divert sufficient revenues so that the profitable businesses built
up by A, B, and C would become unprofitable. The act of the Board
in granting certificates to additional carriers for the same route would,
in effect, destroy the property rights of A, B, and C.
The preservation and protection of these property rights is pretty
important to A, B, and C and the air industry. People are not going to
invest their money unless they have some assurance of some protection.
But it is of much wider significance to our American social structure
based, as it is, on a fear of strong government and a belief in the maxi-
mum of individual freedom, than it is to the individuals affected.
The possibility of impairing or weakening this underpinning of our
American society is very important to the national interest, too. There
should be very convincing proof that the granting of these new certifi-
cates is of the utmost necessity to our national defense and general
public welfare before the investment and property rights of the indi-
vidual be confiscated or destroyed by the state.
The commission called upon to balance these two matters in the
national interest has a very difficult job. It must ask itself: Which is
more important to America: (1) The adding of twenty more reserve
planes and five hundred more reserve air men to our national defense;
and/or the promotion of an air system we think adequate; and/or
needed competition; or (2) Safeguarding the property rights of per-
sons and the preservation of private enterprise?
If at this point pressure groups step in and are permitted to exert
pressure on the court (Board), there must be something very wrong.
We are now ready for the next question. Is the Civil Aeronautics
Board subject to pressure in such cases? The answer, of course, is "yes."
Senators and Congressmen from every city along the route, Cham-
bers of Commerce from every city, veterans' groups, groups organized
by the interested airlines pro and con, all exert pressures on the Board
and its individual members, by letter and telegram, visits, telephone
calls, and intervention in the proceedings, etc.
In a strictly judicial proceeding, any judge permitting such pres-
sures should be removed for cause; any person attempting to exert some
of these pressures would probably be fined or jailed for contempt of
court.
However, the very nature of the Civil Aeronautics Act and the
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mixed functions of the Board in a route case, i.e., executive (promo-
tional), legislative, and judicial, make much of this pressure not only
inevitable but not improper. The various Congressmen have the right
and duty to legitimately press for proper executive action. The various
groups have the same privilege to "lobby" for their interest as they do
before Congress or the executive departments of the Government.
In this atmosphere, of course, some improper pressures are at-
tempted.
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
No attempt will be made in this article to discuss the power of the
Federal Court to do by interpretive decision what Congress did not
do when it enacted the Civil Aeronautics Act. Nor will there be any
extended discussion of how far the court may fix certain standards or
principles (filling in the details) under the Act where the Board has
not done so or seems incapable of doing so. Courts can and do legislate
by interpretive decision within a limited and well defined zone, for, as
we have pointed out before, the division of powers between the Execu-
tive, the Congress, and the Judiciary is not an absolute and complete
division under our American system of government. But the overlap-
ping zones are pretty well defined and limited.
This power of the Federal Courts, and the limits of the power,
as applied to statutes such as the Civil Aeronautics Act, is a difficult
political problem. It will be the subject of another article. We will,
however, point out briefly one of the difficulties of the court in reach-
ing proper decisions and doing justice in its every day dealing with
appeals under the Civil Aeronautics Act, or similar acts.
The Theory of Expertise
To state the doctrine or theory of "expertise," it is first necessary
to again state the philosophy of government behind the regulatory
commissions. The corner stone supporting this philosophy is the con-
clusion by Congress that the independent commission is a necessary
and useful type of agency for the regulation of industry or industrial
activities under certain conditions.
This conclusion arose out of the conviction of Congress that: (1)
Industry, generally, or some certain industry or activity, required Fed-
eral regulation to correct threatened or existing abuses harmful to the
national welfare; (2) That while Congress could prescribe broad stand-
ards or principles designed to check, abolish, or prevent such abuses,
it had not the expertness to prescribe detailed self enforcing rules in
a business world, where economic conditions and industrial technology
are constantly changing; (3) And even if Congress did have expert-
ness, the solution of the varied and specific problems could only be
worked out by trial and error, and continuous application and adapta-
tion against the background of experience - a time consuming process
not adapted to Congressional procedure.
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The result of these conclusions was that Congress created the various
commissions each presumed to be a body of experts in their respective
fields; capable of filling in the details of the broad provisions prescribed
by Congress; and developing and applying principles, and standards,
and processes of reasoning to the varied and specific problems constantly
arising in a rapidly changing business world.
Of course, as the Hoover Commission Task Force points out,25 the
real experts are on the commissions' staff, but the commissioners them-
selves, if properly chosen, may develop a degree of expertness, or at
least be able to intelligently apply the advice of their staff of experts.
The courts in turn accepted the presumption that an independent
regulatory commission is in fact a body of experts advised by a staff of
experts, operating in a field unfamiliar to the court, capable of inter-
preting and filling in the broad provisions of the legislation under
which it acts, and capable of developing and applying standards and
principles of its own within the scope of its delegated power and in the
light of its accumulated background of expertness and experience in
its respective field.
This presumption is the so-called rule (or doctrine) of expertise.
The courts have continuously accepted and applied it, have seldom
ignored or looked behind it, and have usually upheld the decisions
based on the expert opinions of the commissions without examining
the basis of the "expert" opinion or the qualifications of the "experts."
Obviously if the presumption in any given case is erroneous for
any reason - be it because of the act under which the commission
works, or because the commission and/or its staff are not in truth
experts - then there is apt to be a miscarriage of justice.
It is also obvious that the court cannot do much about it if the
doctrine is defeated by poor appointments to the commission and its
staff. It cannot act as a board of impeachment, and the work of govern-
ment must go on.
Nor can it do much about it if the act under which the commission
acts is such that no group of -men can be found who can fulfill the re-
quirements of expertise. A word or two of repetition on this point.
The regulatory legislation which first gave rise to the rule (or doctrine)
of expertise were "thou shall not" laws designed to correct very real
existing abuses existing in certain industries or activities. "Thou shall
not gouge or defraud the public," said Congress. "We -hereby create
an independent regulatory body with delegated powers to stop you
from so doing."
True, there were some broad statements in the purpose provisions,
but in view of the facts surrounding the particular industries these
amounted to little more than noble declarations. Essentially, the jobs
of the commissions were to correct known abuses and to prevent future
abuses of substantially the same nature.
25 An excellent discussion of this point is contained in the Task Force Report
of the Hoover Commission, entitled "Committee on Independent Regulatory Com-
missions-a Report with Recommendations." Chapter III, pp. 18-28.
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Congress and the courts could very well accept the presumption
that experts could be found to carry out these limited delegated powers
and accomplish these limited purposes. But the Civil Aeronautics Act
implies that a commission of five men can be found who are experts in
political science, military science, the business of transportation, cor-
poration finance, and experts in legislation and the law. This is not a
logical presumption.
Let me give an example using the hypothetical route case described
at page 152, supra. Restating the hypothetical case:
Carriers A, B, and C have been certified to operate a route between
East Coast City and West Coast City. They have invested millions of
dollars to organize, finance, and operate their respective business on
this route, and are doing a profitable business without Government
assistance.
The claim is made that other carriers should be permitted to oper-
ate the same route in order to build up a larger reservoir of planes and
men in the interest of national defense. It is also claimed that these car-
riers are exercising monopoly privileges and that more competition is
needed. Furthermore, that commerce and the Postal Service would
benefit if additional carriers were added.
Under its own decisions the Board must answer these questions:
1. Are additional carriers needed over this route in the interest
of the national defense? Now the Board obviously is not composed
of military experts. The doctrine of expertise cannot apply here.
2. Are the additional carriers needed in order to satisfy the de-
mands of the general commerce? The Board is certainly not expert
in this field - certainly no more than the ordinary Federal court.
3. Are additional carriers needed to satisfy the needs of the
Postal Service? The Board and staff have no expert knowledge in
this field.
4. Are more carriers needed to supply necessary competition?
The Board has never agreed on a standard of necessary competi-
tion and therefore cannot be said to be expert on this question.
Finally, we must arrive at the same conclusion that the Interstate
Commerce Commission arrived at years ago. If the Board has any ex-
pertness in a case like this, it is merely to determine on the evidence
and in the light of past experience whether or not the public need
and would commercially support additional air carriers over this route.
But the Board need not decide the case on, this ground alone. It
may assume the role of military expert, commercial economist, political
scientist, and Postal expert, and in a shot gun decision cover the field.
The Federal court, under the expertise rule, may sustain the de-
cision on any of the four grounds unless it appears clearly and on the
record that the Board acted capriciously and arbitrarily.
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The Board Partially Successful
These tests do not prove that the Civil Aeronautics Act has been a
complete failure, or that the Board has been unable to function under
it. In fact, domestically, the Board has been moderately successful in the
"thou shall not" field. It has had a restraining effect and has prevented
wild and speculative expansion. It has also restrained the prevalent
tendency of industry to consolidate into a few powerful groups. There
is but little criticism of its exercise of its safety rule making powers.
And it has protected the public from unfair or discriminatory fares.
Internationally, the Board took the leadership, under Chairman
Welch Pogue, in planning a post war international air transport sys-
tem, and played an important part in negotiating bilateral air transport
agreements enabling our airlines to operate this system.
The Board's fact finding and fact analysis service has been of great
help to the industry.
But the Act has not brought into being a sound and efficient air
transport system. Someone says - "but see how well the airlines are
doing and what a wonderful system we have." Memory of bad times is
short. Only five years ago many of the airlines were insolvent - in fact,
none were too prosperous. Only a very liberal use of Government
subsidy kept the sheriff away. A moderate recession (not a depression)
would probably create the same situation again. Civil air transport
cannot be called a sound and efficient industry under such circum-
stances.
Further, I do not like to contemplate what a socialistic minded
Board supported by a sympathetic President might do to the airlines
in time of crisis. For reasons particular to its members, the Board has
not fully used or asserted the great powers given to it under the Act,
but that does not mean that they are not there and that a Board con-
sisting of different members wouldn't or couldn't assert such powers.
A SUGGESTED APPROACH
We must concede that a very convincing argument can be made
supporting the claim that the "new deal" experiment in independent
regulatory commissions under the Civil Aeronautics Act has not worked
out very well, principally because of the reasons before set forth. Further,
that something must be done about it. We now come to the "how" and
the "what."
As I stated at the beginning, the problem is not one of mere reor-
ganization or "patching up" of existing legislation. If the problem
arises because basic and fundamental principles of our American social
and political systems were ignored by a "New Deal" Congress and
President, then we must go back to the beginning and examine the
problem against the background of these beliefs and principles. This
envolves asking ourselves a few questions. They are:
1. Against the background of the American social structure,
its basic political principles and institutions, and fundamental
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fears and beliefs - what powers can be properly and safely dele-
gated to an independent regulatory commission, such as the Civil
Aeronautics Board?
2. Against the background of experience -which of these
powers (the powers which can be properly delegated) can or can-
not be properly applied by the ordinary independent regulatory
commission, such as the Civil Aeronautics Board?
3. Of the powers which can be properly delegated and which
are susceptible to proper application by a commission- which are
necessary to carry out the regulation found by Congress to be
needed in the national interest?
We are now in a period of revaluing the variation from older and
more traditional principles and beliefs instituted by the "New Deal"
and the "Fair Deal." Some of the "New Deal" variations seem at this
time to be an improvement on the old principles. However, twenty
short years have proven that many of the variations do not work as well
as the old principles, or that they conflict with traditional beliefs which
our people trust and hold to and believe more important.
We believe that a complete and thorough examination, evaluation,
and assessment should be made of the Civil Aeronautics Act experiment
by a committee analogous to the Hoover Commission, and against the
background of the American social structure, traditional political in-
stitutions, and fundamental fears and beliefs. It may be that this
committee might decide that changing conditions justify the concen-
tration of executive, legislative, and judicial powers in one Government
agency with little or no limitations of its powers in respect to private
rights and private enterprise, except the use of its powers in a caprici-
ous, arbitrary manner. And it may be that Congress will agree with it.
In any event the aviation industry and all individual Americans are
entitled to know this.
The Hoover Commission was not concerned with the independent
regulatory commissions per se. It was concerned with the "organization
of the Executive Branch of the Government." Its examination of the
regulatory commissions was incidental and collateral to this subject.
While it revealed many of the things wrong with these regulatory com-
missions, and while it recommended certain shifts and transference of
powers, it was not its responsibility to investigate the role of these
agencies in American society. Its report is very valuable as a point of
departure for such an investigation.
